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Executive Summary
waste-to-energy. Such advanced SWM solutions 
follow different business models with ambitious 
expenditures which have led to more complex 
contractual relations between private service 
providers and local authorities. Due to the complex 
SWM technologies involved, local authorities 
frequently are unable to design, monitor and regulate 
the terms of the contracts awarded to private 
companies. According to a DRI survey of 209 Lebanese 
municipalities in 2018,2 36% of municipalities 
outsource waste management to a private company 
while 46% of them said they managed waste directly. 
This highlights the need to ensure accountability in 
the relationship of municipalities with the private 
sector to avoid further emergence of “new waste 
capitalism”.
The second related issue refers to the limitations of 
Lebanese local authorities in managing solid waste 
and the lessons for applying ISWM in a decentralised 
context. Since 2015, they are playing a bigger role in 
managing their waste and are spearheading the 
construction of more advanced treatment and disposal 
facilities. They are, however, unable to sustain these 
projects financially and operationally. Unsustainable 
facilities that are constructed at great cost result not 
only in a net capital loss for investors, but also in the 
loss of local employment, along with the health and 
environmental costs associated with them. The 
financial consequences of such failures are eventually 
borne by the municipalities and the local taxpayers.
Some local authorities have conducted sensitisation 
campaigns for citizens on issues such as sorting-at-
source and recycling, but most of them are unable to 
mainstream and institutionalise citizen participation 
in an inclusive SWM system. According to DRI’s survey, 
Lebanese municipalities tend to cooperate the most 
with municipal unions (57%), citizens (48%), volunteers 
(40%) and NGOs (38%) on SWM issues. Yet, 39% of 
mayors consider, on average, that engaging with 
citizens on SWM issues is a challenge. This proportion 
is much higher (71%) in municipalities with more than 
30,000 residents (DRI, 2019). Three of the four 
municipalities analysed in this report belong to the 
latter category.
The report draws lessons and policy recommendations 
from four case studies of local authorities that have 
dealt with SWM: (1) the municipality of Bikfaya-
Mhaydseh which runs a sorting facility, (2) the Union of 
2 DRI. 2019. Are municipalities in Lebanon delivering? Survey 
results on solid waste management, public safety, and citizen 
outreach at the local level. Beirut: DRI Lebanon. Available 
on: https://democracy-reporting.org/dri_publications/are-
municipalities-in-lebanon-delivering/.
The issue of solid waste management (SWM) in Lebanon 
has gained much attention among local and 
international observers since the 2015 “waste crisis”, 
when the closure of one of the country’s largest 
landfills in Naameh and the abrupt halt in waste 
collection led to rubbish piling up in the streets of 
Beirut and Mount-Lebanon. This situation triggered 
months-long protests and heated debates around the 
need to re-organise the sector. Yet, the coverage of 
these events has overshadowed the SWM challenges 
faced by peripheral urban areas and the challenges 
that municipalities are facing in ensuring public 
service delivery. The approaches to SWM show the 
remaining issues with decentralisation in Lebanon 
and how cooperation between and coordination of 
different tiers of government in public service provision 
should be improved.
To reduce waste dumping and burning, many disparate 
policies and technologies for SWM exist in Lebanon. 
These include different forms of sorting, recycling, 
landfilling, composting and, most recently, waste-to-
energy.1 Adapting these technologies to local contexts, 
securing funding, negotiating contracts, constructing 
facilities, involving citizens in the process and 
institutionalising best practices are new experiences 
for most municipal authorities. It is therefore crucial 
to take stock of these local experiences to draw 
lessons for a decentralised SWM system and to 
improve multi-level, integrated SWM (ISWM) in 
Lebanon.
This report aims to close the existing knowledge gap 
by documenting local efforts to manage solid waste, 
analysing the limitations of the strategies pursued, 
and present conclusions that can inform integrated 
SWM policies as part of inclusive governance and 
decentralisation. By analysing SWM at the municipal 
level, the report will contribute to an analysis of local 
public policy and decentralisation in Lebanon.
The report identifies two key dynamics underpinning 
local management of solid waste in Lebanon. The first 
is the emergence of a “new waste capitalism” different 
from what has been observed in the 1990s. During that 
time a so-called “waste capitalism” existed, which 
outsourced waste collection and landfilling to 
politically connected businesses ignoring local needs 
and demands. Since the 2015 “waste crisis”, complex 
technologies and treatment methods have been 
favoured that include recycling, composting and 
1  Waste-to-energy includes all technologies that transform 
waste into energy. It includes thermal technologies 
(gasification, pyrolysis etc.) and non-thermal technologies 
(anaerobic digestion, fermentation, mechanical biological 
treatment).
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Jbeil Municipalities, which operates a sorting, 
composting, and landfilling facility in Hbaline, (3) the 
Union of Saida-Zahrani, which uses a sorting, 
composting, and thermal treatment plant for the Saida 
region and beyond (Jezzine, Nabatieh and Beirut), and 
(4) the municipality of Zahlé, which manages a sanitary 
landfill and a sorting and composting facility for the 
Zahlé area. Based on 22 semi-structured interviews 
with municipal officials and executives, representatives 
of facilities, donor agencies, NGOs, and a database on 
the distribution of SWM facilities across Lebanon that 
draws information from official sources, including the 
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), 
the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative 
Reform (OMSAR), the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), 
the Ministry of Environment (MoE) and donor agencies, 
the report calls for the adoption of inclusive practices 
and sustainable regulatory frameworks for SWM to 
limit the destabilising role of politically connected 
private companies managing municipal solid waste 
and makes the following recommendations: 
Recommendations for Sustainable and 
Inclusive ISWM in Lebanon
Local authorities need to be empowered through 
further deepening the decentralisation process to 
provide crucial services to their constituents. At the 
same time, it is imperative that the central government 
regulates the relationship between the private and 
public sector in the delivery of public services. 
To establish a clear framework and ensure compliance 
control and sustainable SWM, we recommend the 
following:
1. Establishing a central regulatory body and strong 
oversight: There is a need for a strong regulatory 
authority at the central level that ensures 
compliance control for the successful 
decentralisation of any service sector like SWM. To 
mitigate the effects of the intersection of the 
provision of public services with informal political 
networks, these regulations should ensure 
government transparency in the creation, 
construction, and maintenance of SWM facilities in 
which public and private entities are involved. The 
adoption of standard bidding documents, technical 
terms of reference to evaluate service delivery, and 
model templates for SWM contracts could also 
improve the management of SWM contracts and 
mitigate their negative effects on municipal budgets.
2. Adopting a national master plan: The MoE must 
develop a national master plan for Lebanese SWM, 
as per the provisions of the 2018 ISWM Law. It 
cannot be left to the private sector to identify sites 
for the installation of facilities. In the context of 
rapid urbanisation and limited available space, it is 
crucial to map existing SWM efforts and identify the 
geographic locations in which a treatment plant 
could be established. The master plan should 
identify different SWM technologies suitable to the 
Lebanese context, enshrine the pillars of the circular 
economy (reduce, reuse, recycle) as key strategic 
objectives, and call for regionalised waste 
management systems that achieve economies of 
scale by uniting several local authorities in broader 
service areas. Local authorities would develop their 
own master plan in line with the national strategy.
3. Adopting a cost recovery system: Local authorities 
must be given the mandate to implement cost 
recovery schemes dedicated specifically to SWM. 
ISWM should be sustained by a combination of 
several taxation sources, including property taxes, 
charges on utility consumption bills, tourist taxes, 
user charges on households and commercial units, 
industrial taxes, as well as intergovernmental 
transfers. This would safeguard the local authorities’ 
autonomy to implement viable solutions in a 
decentralised context and, at the same time, 
incentivise waste reduction and sorting-at-source.
4. Involving citizens and informal recycling actors: 
Greater engagement with citizens should be 
mainstreamed to promote environmentally sound 
practices along the three pillars of the circular 
economy. The MoE and local authorities should 
organise policy dialogues and debates and involve 
CSOs and citizen groups in planning and 
implementing SWM projects. This includes involving 
them in awareness-raising and sensitisation 
campaigns about waste reduction, source 
separation and recycling. Informal waste collectors 
and recyclers should be registered and included in 
the SWM process. 
5. Capacity-building: The MoE and the Ministry of 
Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) must provide 
training and technical guidance to local authorities 
on best practices for managing solid waste and 
awarding and managing service contracts 
sustainably. 
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Map 1. The four case studies of local authorities 
dealing with SWM addressed in this report.
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1. Introduction
Local Authorities and SWM in Lebanon: A 
Fraught Relationship
The distribution of responsibilities and duties between 
national and local authorities regarding SWM remains 
ambiguous, with many overlapping mandates. A 1931 
French mandate-era decision first delegated 
responsibility for waste management to municipalities. 
Since then, several regulations have assigned SWM to 
local authorities.3 In the post-civil war era, national 
institutions have been at the centre of SWM 
administration. The CDR issued the National Emergency 
Recovery Plan and planned the use of World Bank loans 
in support of landfilling, before promoting Waste to 
Energy solutions (2010). Since its creation in 1993, the 
MoE also developed national strategies for the sector. 
OMSAR also supported local authorities through EU 
loans to develop SWM facilities. 
In the wake of the 2015 crisis, the government’s strategy 
has focused on increasing local authorities’ 
responsibility in SWM. On 9 September 2015, the 
Council of Ministers approved a waste management 
plan that, inter alia, endorsed the decentralisation of 
waste management duties by allocating them to local 
authorities. It did not, however, formulate a long-term 
plan for the decentralisation of waste management 
that takes into consideration the necessary resources 
and technical competences to carry out such duties. 
Three years later, the Law on Integrated Solid Waste 
Management No. 80, issued on 10 October 2018, 
introduced the principle of integrated SWM, where local 
authorities are granted large powers for SWM. Despite 
the principle of administrative decentralisation in 
waste management being enshrined in Article 9 of the 
new law, the central government is given large discretion 
to run its own SWM projects, thus destabilising the 
decentralised power of local authorities.  
This consolidation of the responsibility of Lebanese 
local authorities in SWM follows a global trend in 
which local authorities have increasingly been 
recognised as primary actors in service delivery. Since 
1998, when municipal elections were held for the first 
time since 1963, the number of municipalities and 
municipal unions has continuously risen, reflecting 
the increasing importance of their role as key 
development agents. Yet, their capacity to deliver on 
their large scope of intervention is limited. There are 
wide disparities in population size, budgetary power, 
3 These include the Decree on Public Cleanliness No. 8735 of 
23 August 1974, the Municipal Act No. 118 of 30 June 1977, 
and Decree No. 9093/2002 that offers financial incentives to 
municipalities that host a waste management facility. See 
DRI (2019).
Even in a country familiar with recurrent political 
gridlock, the so-called “waste crisis” in Beirut and the 
surrounding Mount-Lebanon area in the summer of 
2015 was shocking to local observers with rubbish 
piling up and being openly burnt in the streets. This 
waste crisis led to paralysis within the Lebanese 
political system for the first time since the end of the 
Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) which rendered 
government elites incapable of enacting proactive 
solutions. Some advocated wholesale privatisation of 
solid waste management (SWM) at the national level; 
the opening of a larger landfill in Akkar and the Beqaa or 
exporting solid waste. The financial interests of key 
elite players blocked each of these propositions. 
Meanwhile, groups emerged as political actors who 
organised popular protests and criticised the 
government.
Several researchers have since analysed the 2015 
Lebanese SWM crisis and its aftermath. They mainly 
focused on the impact of the crisis and SWM practices 
on the environment and the economy (Ghadban, 
Shames, & Abou Mayaleh, 2017) (Morsi, et al., 2017) 
(Human Rights Watch, 2017) (Verdeil, 2017); on technical 
solutions that would enable more sustainable 
approaches (Abbas I. , Chaaban, Al-Rabaa, & Shaar, 
2017) (Azzi, 2017) (Karaki, 2016) (Hammoud, Kassem, & 
Mourtada, 2014); and on the roots of the crisis within 
the Lebanese political system (political economy and 
new types of social movements) (AbiYaghi, Catusse, & 
Younes, 2017) (Khalil J., 2017) (El Richani, 2017) (Deets 
& Skulte-Ouaiss, 2016) (Kraidy, 2016) (Stel & van der 
Molen, 2015) (Abu-Rish, 2015) (McCornack, 2012), 
(Atallah, 2015 a, b).
This report is interested primarily in the latter issue – 
specifically, how SWM can be used as a lens for 
understanding local public policy and decentralisation 
in Lebanon. What technologies, processes, and political 
networks do municipalities and municipal unions 
mobilise, and to what end? Such discussion is 
particularly useful for approaching the broader topic of 
decentralisation in Lebanon, a term referring to the 
series of policy interventions that would support 
meaningful financial and administrative autonomy of 
local government. Decentralisation, in varying forms, is 
frequently advocated by academics and policymakers 
as a solution for Lebanon yet has not gained enough 
political traction to be a practicable alternative. Our 
report highlights how the analysis of the SWM sector 
can enhance our understanding of how to effectively 
support the local authorities in the Lebanese context 
and how to ensure coordination and cooperation 
between central and local government. The report also 
identifies the opportunities and limitations of different 
SWM techniques.
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human resources, technical skills, and level of 
coordination between unions and their member 
municipalities. Many local authorities have weak or 
virtually non-existent administrative and financial 
resources. Some still succeed in conducting ambitious 
projects, developing long-term strategic plans, and 
creating complex systems of institutionalisation 
(Favier, 2001) (Harb & Atallah, 2015). Despite these 
successes by local authorities in developing their own 
SWM projects, the necessary know-how to plan and 
execute an integrated SWM system along the principles 
of good governance are still missing. Today, 87% of 
Lebanon’s municipalities manage, in one way or 
another, their own waste. Among those, 93% are 
involved in waste collection, but as the stages of the 
SWM cycle become more advanced, requiring more 
technical sorting and treatment techniques, 
municipalities are less and less able to fulfil their 
responsibilities. Aside from the lack of resources, they 
cite structural challenges as reasons for this, such as 
ineffective laws and regulations and lack of central 
government guidance (DRI, 2017; 2019).
Some analysts have linked the limited capacity of local 
authorities with the nature of the Lebanese political 
system and its political economy. Many municipalities 
and unions fall under the influence of Lebanon’s 
political patrons, sectarian parties, and extended 
family networks or wealthy regional landowners. The 
local governance landscape in Lebanon has been 
characterised as an archipelago of local and regional 
networks defending the interests of regional and 
national political patrons (Ishtay, 2001) (Favier, 2001) 
(Harb & Atallah, 2015) (Abu-Rish, 2016).
Following the civil war, SWM became a highly profitable 
sector that was monopolised by large firms connected to 
influential political figures. In the mid-1990s, and in the 
absence of municipal elections, the Lebanese 
government entrusted the responsibility for SWM in 
Beirut and the surrounding region to the CDR. The CDR 
subsequently awarded a contract for waste collection, 
sorting, treatment and disposal to a private company, 
Sukleen. The operational perimeter of Sukleen was later 
extended to encompass all of Beirut and Mount-Lebanon, 
except for the Jbeil district. The Lebanese government 
paid Sukleen through deductions from the equalisation 
payments of the Independent Municipal Fund (IMF), a 
major source of financial support exclusive to 
municipalities and unions, funded through a variety of 
government transfers and national taxes. This payment 
arrangement constituted a glaring infringement of the 
Municipal Act and the Decree No. 1917 of 6 April 1979 
establishing the IMF, which stipulate that these funds 
belong to the local authorities.
Controversy around how the Sukleen contract was 
awarded, funded, and managed lasted for two decades. 
Critics denounced low recycling rates and the rapidity 
with which the capacity of the Naameh landfill was 
exceeded, indicating excessive landfilling without prior 
treatment, contrary to the clauses of the contract. 
Various contractual issues also emerged: the dollars-
per-tonne rate paid through the IMF was exceptionally 
high (around USD 177 per tonne), rendering Sukleen’s 
rate one of the most expensive in the world. Moreover, 
the limited financial capacity of local authorities to 
cover these expenses and their growing dissatisfaction 
with Sukleen’s services were ignored. The health and 
environmental impacts of the Naameh landfill were 
also criticised (Verdeil, 2013) (UN-Habitat & Muhanna 
Foundation, 2015). Outside Sukleen’s area, waste 
dumping and open-air burning was used in various 
localities, with only a few municipalities engaging in 
sustainable SWM approaches (Giannozzi, 2017).
In the wake of the 2015 “waste crisis” and the gradual 
assignment of SWM tasks to local authorities, the 
“waste capitalism” that was formerly associated with 
the dominant sectarian factions at the national level 
started shifting to the local and regional levels.
Methodology
This report builds on the concept of “instrumentation”, 
which is the political process through which technical 
and operational processes are decided, and how such 
decisions become integrated in existing institutional 
structures (Halpern, Lascoumes, & Le Galès, 2014) 
(Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2004) (Hood, 2007) (Hood & 
Peter, 2004) (Salamon & Elliot, 2002) (McCormick, 1998) 
(Varone, 1998) (Lascoumes & Simard, L’action publique 
au prisme de ses instruments: Introduction, 2011). 
Rather than grounding the analysis of SWM in a macro-
level overview of Lebanese politics, the analysis tracks 
how local political dynamics, legislation and regulations 
enable and at the same time constrain technical 
approaches to SWM.
This study relies on two methodological approaches. 
The first approach involves the construction of a 
database that details the status of various SWM 
facilities, including their location, territorial coverage, 
technology, treatment capacity, and funding source. 
This database uses data collected by the CDR, along 
with other sources from OMSAR, the MoPH, key 
informants at the MoE, international agencies, and 
local authorities. Where possible, information was 
verified through multiple sources.
The second approach relies on analysis of four SWM case 
studies: (1) the municipality of Bikfaya-Mhaydseh, (2) 
the municipal union of Jbeil, (3) the municipal union of 
Saida-Zahrani, and (4) the municipality of Zahlé. These 
illustrate differences in the nature and size of the local 
authority, the type of contract and of the operator for 
SWM, the degree of technological sophistication, and 
the level of citizen engagement. The case studies rely on 
an extensive data-set that consists of press reports, 
primary documentation provided by municipalities and 
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other relevant actors, observations from guided visits to 
SWM facilities, and 22 semi-structured interviews with 
mayors, municipal council members, municipal union 
representatives, engineers, technical employees, facility 
representatives, employees of funding agencies, local non-
governmental organisation members and environmental 
activists.
The Geography of SWM in Lebanon
Unregulated disposal and open burning are the 
dominant practices for dealing with solid waste in 
Lebanon. These practices are most spread in the 
governorate (muhafaza) of Baalback-Hermel, where no 
treatment facilitates exist. Informal dumpsites are 
prevalent throughout Lebanon, particularly in the 
districts of Rashaya, Chouf, Zgharta, Koura, the 
governorates of South-Lebanon and Nabatieh (Bint-
Jbeil, Hasbaya, Marjeyoun and Jezzine), and the urban 
clusters of Beirut and Tripoli. According to the original 
data-set, and based on the nature of the treatment and 
disposal facilities and their capacities, 37% of total 
non-dumped solid waste in Lebanon in 2018 is planned 
to be landfilled (formally or informally), 45% to be 
composted, 16% to be sorted and 2% to be treated in 
waste-to-energy plants. However, many plants are 
operating below their capacity.  
Disposal and treatment facilities – landfills, composting 
facilities, and waste-to-energy facilities – are located 
predominantly in urban areas. Of the six largest 
facilities, three are in the greater Beirut area: two 
seaside landfills-reclaimed-on-sea (Bourj Hammoud 
and Costa Brava), and the Karantina sorting and 
composting facility.4 The three other sites are a sanitary 
landfill in Zahlé, another in Tripoli, and an anaerobic 
composting and waste-to-energy plant in Saida. While 
the treatment plants of Zahlé and Tripoli service only 
the urban municipality and immediate surrounding 
villages, the four other facilities in Beirut and Saida 
service larger territories, including Beirut and 
surroundings. Bourj Hammoud, Costa Brava and 
Karatina service the largest areas of the governorates 
of Beirut and Mount-Lebanon. For Saida, this includes 
the Saida municipality and its larger agglomeration, as 
well as the Jezzine district. In the last three years, Saida 
has been dealing with waste from the Municipality of 
Beirut as a result of a political agreement. All other 
facilities in the districts of Sour, Jbeil, Chouf, Metn, 
Koura, Dannieh and Hasbaya can only process small 
quantities of waste.
4  This analysis excludes the now-closed landfill of Naameh.
These disposal and treatment facilities have been the 
target of controversies as to their sustainability as well 
as their environmental impact. Costa Brava and Bourj 
Hammoud landfills were initially designed as temporary 
solutions but are now being managed as de facto 
permanent facilities. Beyond the greater Beirut area, 
the regions facing the most pressing challenges are the 
governorates of Akkar and Baalback-Hermel and the 
district of West-Beqaa, where the ratio between 
produced and treated waste is highest. Given the 
amount of waste these areas produce, their near-total 
lack operational facilities are concerning. The districts 
of Batroun, Zgharta, Bint-Jbeil and Rashaya also lack 
facilities, yet produce less waste, while Sour has 
operational facilities but is incapable of processing the 
waste produced by their residents. 
According to the data consulted, implementing the 
planned treatment facilities would likely double the 
overall waste treatment capacity in Lebanon.5 Such 
facilities would concentrate additional waste treatment 
capacity primarily in the governorates of the North 
(31.5%), Akkar (20.5%), and the Beqaa (19.8%). Yet our 
projections indicate that planned treatment facilities 
for the governorate of Baalbeck-Hermel and the district 
of Sour will remain insufficient to meet local SWM 
needs. Planned treatment facilities in the governorates 
of Beirut and Mount-Lebanon will also not have enough 
capacity to treat the quantities of solid waste currently 
sent to the Costa Brava and Bourj Hammoud landfills. 
Planned facilities seem focused on developing the 
composting capacity: composting represents 55% of 
the total intended new investments in treatment 
capacity and is the primary investment regarding 
planned facilities in all governorates except Nabatieh. 
These investments would raise the total plant’s 
estimated composting capacity by 150%. Waste-to-
energy represents 20% of the planned investment and 
landfilling 19%. New landfills have been planned for 
Akkar, Dannieh, Jbeil, Baalback, West-Beqaa, Nabatieh, 
Bint-Jbeil and Sour. Interest in thermal technology 
exists in the North- and-Mount Lebanon governorates.
The four case studies represent different aspects of 
this complex, rapidly evolving landscape and offer an 
in-depth understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the different strategies employed by 
local authorities. Waste management facilities in Zahlé, 
Saida and Jbeil were established before the 2015 crisis, 
while Bikfaya’s facility was established in 2016 as a 
direct response to the national deterioration in SWM 
service quality. Most of these facilities struggle to 
remain financially sustainable and have been the target 
of popular and political contestations.
5 The data includes projects listed by the CDR, OMSAR, MoE 
and several international organisations but may have omitted 
preliminary projects planned by local authorities, such as the 
projects of building waste-to-energy plants in Beirut and the 
district of Jbeil on the Hbaline site.
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Map 2. Lebanon population at district level.
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Map 3. Planned and operational coverage by 2018.
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Map 4. Solid waste infrastructure types in Lebanon.
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2.  The Municipality of Bikfaya-Mhaydseh: A Low-Tech Approach 
with Strong Local Support, Yet Incapable of Scaling-up
Map 5.  Location of the Bikfaya-Mhaydseh municipality.  
Source: Authors (2018).
Map 6.  The greater Bikfaya agglomeration.  
Source: Authors, based on Google Earth (2018).
Bikfaya is a town of approximately 10,000 inhabitants 
located in a mountainous area within the Metn district 
in the Mount-Lebanon governorate (Maps 5–6). It lies at 
the heart of an urban cluster of 20,000 inhabitants that 
includes three other villages: Mhaydseh, Saqiet el-
Misk, and Bhersaf. It contains an industrial zone and 
many commercial shops. The area consists of two 
municipalities, Bikfaya-Mhaydseh (henceforth referred 
to as “Bikfaya Municipality”) and Saqiet el-Misk-
Bhersaf, both members of the Union of Municipalities 
of Coastal and Central Metn.
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SWM Background
Before 1994, Bikfaya, like most localities, disposed of 
its solid waste through unsupervised dumping and 
burning. The area began sending waste to the Bourj 
Hammoud dumpsite during the civil war. From 1994 to 
2015, Sukleen treated and collected Bikfaya’s waste as 
part of the Beirut and Mount-Lebanon service area, the 
cost of which was directly deducted from the 
municipality’s share of the IMF.
After the summer of 2015, the inability of the 
municipality and the central government to propose 
viable solutions encouraged residents to propose their 
own. A group of volunteers (initially without any 
knowledge of SWM), led by a local figure, Nicole 
Gemayel, began promoting recycling and sorting at 
source, later benefiting from guidance and training 
offered by the environmental NGO Arcenciel. The 
group’s collaboration with the municipality in 
subsequent months led to the removal of piles of waste 
from the streets and to a shift in the municipality’s 
discourse, which gradually started prohibiting waste 
dumping. Lacking a facility that would sort and 
sustainably dispose of the waste, the municipality 
designated a 2,000 square metre, municipal-owned 
land in the industrial zone and hired local engineers to 
build the facility using a shell container purchased from 
a UN agency. The facility, dubbed “BiClean” (a 
portmanteau for Bi-kfaya and Clean, pronounced “Be 
clean”) was created in March 2016.
In May 2016, Gemayel was elected as the head of the 
municipality. The election perpetuated the historical 
ties between the municipality and the Kataeb Party, to 
which she is connected by kinship: her father, Amine 
Gemayel, is the former party head (and previously the 
President of Lebanon), and her brother, Samy Gemayel, 
is the party’s current leader and a member of Parliament. 
Bikfaya’s SWM System
Following her election, Gemayel expanded the 
municipality’s involvement in SWM, further relying on 
the team of volunteers and CSOs that helped to acquire 
additional equipment. The municipality led an 
awareness campaign on the importance of sorting-at-
source, which included brochures, door-to-door 
communication, open meetings and conferences. It 
also encouraged good practices by marking poorly 
sorted bags with a red warning sticker.6
At the technical level, the Bikfaya SWM system is quite 
simple. BiClean relies on a collection process based on 
household (primary) sorting, according to which 
separate bags for different types of waste are collected 
daily, excluding weekends, by municipal trucks. 
Although the system could be better sustained by 
introducing drop-off stations that would minimise the 
cost of direct household pick-up, the municipality does 
not do so because of its incapacity to establish an 
effective monitoring system on the quality of the 
incoming waste. To compensate for this, BiClean 
accepts sorted waste delivered from other sources.
BiClean’s role consists of the second round of manual 
sorting, using conveyors designed by a local team,7 
followed by compression of separated waste types. The 
compressed waste is then sold or transported to 
facilities responsible for their further treatment or final 
disposal. No incineration or dumping occurs in the 
process. BiClean has the capacity to sort approximately 
10–15 tonnes of solid waste per day.
6 Interview with Lina Gemayel, Manager of BiClean sorting 
facility, 28 March 2018.
7  Interview with the head operator of BiClean sorting facility (6 
March 2018).
Figure 1. “BiClean” recycling facility. Source: Based on Google Earth.
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Graph 2. Sorting and Treatment Process. Source: Authors (2018).
Graph 1. BiClean Work Process. Source: Authors (2018).
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Assessment: The Issue of Sustainability 
As with most local SWM initiatives, financial 
sustainability is a key challenge. Initially, revenues 
from sold recyclables covered a mere 15% of the 
facility’s operational costs, and the expansion of the 
network of buyers only increased it to 20%, also 
considering the additional cost of transporting the 
recyclables. Yet, for the municipality, the financial 
burden of waste management is much less than what it 
used to be under the Sukleen contract: the facility’s 
operational costs are estimated at 77–80 USD per 
tonne, a small part of which is paid for through revenues 
from recyclables, compared to the 177 USD per tonne 
the municipality previously paid Sukleen.8
Financial support and close oversight by Bikfaya’s 
municipality were key to ensure the viability of the 
BiClean facility. Historically, the close relations with 
the neighbouring municipality of Saqiet el-Misk-
Bhersaf have also been beneficial, allowing both to pool 
resources to serve a larger agglomeration. Other actors, 
such as local NGOs, schools, companies, and trained 
volunteers, have also contributed to the municipality’s 
awareness campaign and the development of BiClean. 
The NGO Arcenciel has provided training and technical 
guidance, along with MercyCorps, USAID, UK Aid, and 
ACTED. Their roles, however, seem to have diminished 
in later stages of the project development. 
Key conclusions can be derived from the Bikfaya 
example. Firstly, a recycling and sorting approach has 
enabled the municipality to face the 2015 waste crisis 
more effectively than most others. Secondly, Bikfaya’s 
SWM model has generated considerable savings 
compared to the cost of Sukleen’s services. Thirdly, the 
BiClean SWM system was made possible thanks to a 
rare model of cooperation between individuals and 
organisations sharing similar social, economic and 
political backgrounds in a relatively small area. This 
may mean that similar initiatives could be more difficult 
to implement in larger or more politically fractured 
areas, provided they have the resources and sustained 
will to implement this model. It noteworthy that this 
project did not benefit from any guidance or support 
from the central government.
The BiClean facility has faced several technical 
challenges. In March 2018, the facility generated noise 
and odour from organic waste that affected the 
surrounding area, and flies could be seen around the 
facility, mainly due to open composting. This led the 
BiClean managers to stop open composting and start 
another project aiming to transform organic waste into 
liquid fertilisers, while considering sending organics to 
a farm in the Beqaa. The location of BiClean in a sparsely 
populated industrial zone, however, has meant that 
local complaints remained limited. 
8 Interview with BiClean manager (28 March 2018) and the 
mayor of Bikfaya-Mhaydseh (17 January 2019).
The BiClean facility employs approximately 30 
individuals, including manual sorting workers, truck 
drivers, pickers, and managers. The municipality 
monitors waste sorting and collection and manages the 
facility. In each of these tasks, municipal personnel are 
assisted by international and local organisations as 
well as the Kataeb Party. BiClean’s physical 
infrastructure, equipment and all operational costs 
(salaries, maintenance, collection and transportation) 
are financed by the municipality. Although the municipal 
council has considered the idea of a local tax or fee to 
recover the cost of waste management, this is not 
foreseen in the current legal framework and would 
likely be resisted by the local population.
Political Dimensions of SWM in Bikfaya
On the political level, the Kataeb party represents the 
success of Bikfaya’s SWM system as a result of its 
efforts. The kinship and political ties to the party make 
it difficult to demarcate where local government begins 
and where the party’s influence ends. Current party 
head, Samy Gemayel, has marketed this experience as 
a successful example of the party’s approach to SWM, 
along the principles of “expanded decentralisation”, 
government transparency and environmental 
responsibility, in opposition to Sukleen’s performance 
(Baaklini, 2016).
Figure 2. The head of the Kataeb party at the 
inauguration of the BiClean facility, March 2016. 
Source: https://www.facebook.com/BiCleanleb/.
The initiative necessitated not only the learning of 
technical competence, but also a sustained, collective 
effort. The political backing of the Kataeb party was 
crucial to marketing such efforts to residents. Given 
that neighbouring municipalities are under the influence 
of other political actors, they do not acknowledge 
Bikfaya as a model or cooperate with the Kataeb party 
to replicate it. The Union of Municipalities of Coastal 
and Central Metn, led by Mirna Murr, daughter of Metn 
MP Michel Murr, has, for instance, not been supportive. 
Instead, she has advocated a “waste-to-energy 
solution” for the Metn district by establishing a thermal 
power plant in Bourj Hammoud.
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A more overarching technical concern is the degree to 
which it relies on the disposal of recyclables, non-
recyclables and organic materials by sending them, 
after sorting, to clients that subsequently re-use or 
dispose of them. When scaled, this dynamic may be 
unsustainable on the long term: as waste sorting in the 
country increases, the growing quantity of recyclables 
demanded by industries and enterprises may drive the 
price down and reduce the facility’s revenues. 
The sorting and recycling approach of Bikfaya’s SWM 
also points to additional structural limitations in the 
financial ability of municipalities to implement such 
projects. BiClean currently relies on a private industrial 
waste-to-energy plant in the Beqaa to dispose of its 
non-recyclables (approx. 20–30% of the treated waste). 
The municipality planned to develop its own industrial 
facility for thermal treatment of non-recyclables with 
the same private investor, but such a facility requires a 
minimum of 100 tonnes of waste per day, which Bikfaya 
does not currently generate. Even if Bikfaya’s 
surrounding towns would join the project, the break-
even point would be only in 14 years. Most surrounding 
towns preferred to maintain their current SWM 
contracts, managed by the central government, 
because they could not ensure the stability of their 
financial resources, mostly coming from delayed 
transfers from the IMF. Because of these budgetary 
limitations, the municipality of Saqiet el-Misk-Bhersaf 
has stopped sending its waste to BiClean, thereby 
threatening the viability of the facility.
One of the financial limitations of the Bikfaya model 
stems, paradoxically, from one of its core strengths, 
the reliance on efficient sorting at source. The mayor 
describes an effective cycle, which was set off once 
households started sorting: “When people realised that 
the solution was effective, they stopped dumping.” She 
also recalls the difficulties of convincing residents to 
change their behaviour before seeing the results of 
collective efforts (AlKantar, 2016). Municipal outreach 
encouraging youth participation in recycling-centric art 
projects (Figures 3–5) facilitated the initiative’s success 
as did their reliance on the expertise of NGOs together 
with learning by trial-and-error. Though an impact 
evaluation has yet to be conducted, staff and local 
observers state that such campaigns have been 
effective in encouraging residents to sort at their 
households.9 
9 According to the mayor, all inhabitants sort their waste. But 
the quality of this sorting is medium, hence the necessity to 
reprocess it in the facility (interview, 17 January 2019).
Figure 3. Participation of Scouts and School Students in 
the BiClean Process. Source: BiClean Facebook Page.
Prior to the 2015 waste crisis, the Bikfaya municipality 
was neither particularly active nor innovative in SWM. 
After the crisis, however, it leveraged local political ties 
and communal enthusiasm to produce an 
environmentally conscious and relatively efficient SWM 
model. Yet issues of financial sustainability, scalability, 
and replicability highlight the challenges local 
governments face in managing solid waste within the 
Lebanese institutional landscape. While this model has 
proven both technically and politically successful at 
the micro-level, technical, financial and political 
considerations limit its potential to serve as an example 
for other areas, particularly larger, more densely 
populated and politically diverse ones. The example 
shows that costly development projects that would be 
more financially efficient if scaled up need to cultivate 
social and political cooperation. This is often impossible 
in the current state of the decentralisation process.
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Figure 4. Construction of Wall with Unused Tyres. Source: BiClean Facebook Page.
Figure 5. Different Usage of Recyclables Source: BiClean Facebook Page.
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3.  The Jbeil Union of Municipalities:  
Managing a Dumpsite Turned Landfill
The SWM treatment and disposal facility located in 
Hbaline is owned by the Jbeil Union of Municipalities 
(henceforth referred to as the “Union”). The district of 
Jbeil, part of the Mount-Lebanon governorate, contains 
85 towns and villages across 380 square kilometres, 
with approximately 70,000 residents. The coastal areas 
have been increasingly urbanised over the last decade, 
while the mountainous inland remains rural. The 
administrative and economic centre of the district is 
the city of Jbeil, a key tourist destination in Lebanon.
The Union, one of the oldest in Lebanon, was founded in 
1981 and is headquartered in Jbeil. It has a council of 14 
members representing each of the member 
municipalities. The Union has a small number of 
employees, including two in its administrative 
department and six in its engineering section.10 In 
charge of the SWM within the Union territory is a council 
member, representing the municipality of Jbeil, who 
follows up on monthly reports, issued by the Hbaline 
facility managers, detailing the facility’s operations 
and finances. 
10 Interestingly, the municipality of Jbeil has far greater financial 
resources and more employees (approximately 110) than the 
Union and is more closely connected to international donors.
Map 7. The Jbeil District showing the Hbaline dumpsite and the union’s area. Source: Authors (2018).
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The Jbeil Union SWM System
In 1983, the Hbaline facility was established on 10,000 
square metre land purchased by the municipality of 
Jbeil, with the aim to use it as an open-air dump 
replacing dumpsites near Jbeil’s old city. In 1984, the 
management of the Hbaline dumpsite was transferred 
from the municipality to the Union, allowing member 
municipalities to dispose of their solid waste there. In 
the post-war years, confident that the dump would be a 
reliable solution to their problems, the Union decided 
not to be part of Sukleen’s service area.
In 1998, the World Bank provided a USD 55 million loan 
to the Lebanese government, managed by the CDR, 
which aimed to transform major dumpsites into sanitary 
landfills. USD 6.5 million of this loan were allocated to 
the Hbaline dumpsite. Union officials claim that this 
funding was never delivered and that the Union later 
used USD 1 million from its own budget to expand the 
dump from 10,000 to 120,000 square metres.
Between 2004 and 2007, donations from the European 
Union (EUR 1.1 million), and USAID (USD 1.3 million) 
allowed the construction of a disposal and treatment 
facility to replace the one in Hbaline. The facility became 
operational in 2007 and was managed by the Union, 
with a processing capacity of 77 tonnes per day servicing 
approximately 105,000 residents. It initially aimed to 
recycle 20% of the waste received and to start 
composting, but its recycling capacity could not exceed 
3% nor did the intended composting technique (using 
fermentation tunnels) ever materialise. Moreover, the 
facility did not end the entrenched practice of informal 
dumping and open-air incineration. Protests about 
local pollution as a result of waste burning eventually 
forced local authorities to close the dumpsite.
In 2010, the then-newly elected mayor of Jbeil, Ziad 
Hawat, a prominent local business leader, was elected 
as the head of the Union. Dissatisfied with the 
management of the Hbaline site, he decided to 
outsource SWM operations and ensure a more 
professional management of the facility by contracting 
Sanitek, a private company. Its poor performance led 
the Union to close the facility again in 2011 but Sanitek 
continued to manage the dumpsite without running the 
facility. As a result, waste piled up in the dumpsite as 
high as nearly 50 metres, causing a landslide into the 
river, contaminating the groundwater of the region 
(ELARD, 2011).
The politicisation of the solid waste issue in Lebanon in 
the summer of 2015 sparked a controversy around the 
mismanagement of the Hbaline dump.11 Under the 
pressure of local politicians and activists affiliated with 
the “You Stink” movement, the Union terminated 
Sanitek’s contract for managing the dumpsite.
Figure 6. Local Protesters Denouncing Waste 
Mismanagement in Jbeil. Source: Greenarea.me.
Figure 7. Solid waste piling up in Hbaline dump which 
led to a landslide. Source: Authors (2018).
In 2016, a private company, Batco, won a new tender for 
managing the Hbaline facility and transforming the 
dumpsite site into a sanitary landfill. To finance the 
operation, the Union contracted a USD 6.7 million loan,12 
sparing its member municipalities a heavy financial 
burden. Although the treatment facility was operational 
11 Politicians suggested disposing of the waste of Metn and 
Keserwan districts in Hbaline and a landmark study made 
by the Danish firm Ramboll suggested using the dumpsite to 
dispose of the fly ash generated by the incinerator planned in 
Beirut’s Karantina area.
12 According to the Union, the funding was contracted as an 
advance loan from the MoF against a 40% deduction from 
the Union’s share of the IMF.  
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again, it could not accommodate the quantity of 
incoming waste (approximately 170 tonnes per day). 
Given that Batco charges the Union 30 USD per tonne of 
waste, the loan will likely sustain the costs for four 
years only. The collection and transportation of waste 
to Hbaline remain the responsibility of individual 
municipalities, of which only Ehmej and Jbeil sort at 
source. Had sorting at source been mainstreamed in 
the Jbeil area, the facility would have had higher 
chances of viability.
The current SWM system meets the basic collection 
needs of the Jbeil district. The Union and every 
municipality in the district pay Sanitek for waste 
collection on a per-tonne basis, with Batco running the 
facility to this day. The treatment method consists of 
separating organic waste from recyclables through 
visual checks, manual and mechanical sorting, then 
landfilling organic materials. Today, around 10% of the 
surface of the dumpsite has been transformed into a 
sanitary landfill. Only 4% of the incoming solid waste is 
sorted,13 partly because of the absence of municipal 
initiatives encouraging sorting at source. The facility has 
around 30 workers supervised by the landfill director 
who oversees operations and helps to develop a database 
for incoming and outgoing waste. The operations are also 
overseen by the Union representative.
In 2018, the Union launched a tender to expand the 
sanitary landfill and the sorting facility and build 21 
fermentation tunnels for composting. The successful 
bidder should bear the responsibility of the facilities’ 
financial sustainability, while the cost of waste 
collection, no longer borne by the Union but the member 
municipalities will rise from USD 30 to USD 35 per tonne. 
The contract has not been awarded yet (August 2019). 
13  Interested companies and factories purchase sorted 
materials on site.
Assessment:  
Outsourcing to the Private Sector
Since Hbaline’s inception, the Union has remained the 
chief decision-maker in SWM. Despite political rifts 
between the political factions that compose the Union’s 
council,14 all SWM-related decisions were taken by 
consensus between the Union’s municipalities.
Local activism has played a minor role, only noticeable 
in the aftermath of the “You Stink” movement when a 
group of protesters blocked the entrance of the 
Hbaline facility to oppose the import of waste from 
outside the area.
Little conflict existed around the facility’s technical 
specifications and the issue of waste-to-energy. 
Overall, the rehabilitation of the site and its gradual 
transformation into a sanitary landfill has been 
accepted by the Union as the optimal solution to 
regional SWM, although its financial sustainability 
was recognised as a major challenge. In 2010, the 
Union reached a quick consensus to outsource the 
management of Hbaline to the private sector believing 
in the superiority of privatised management. The 
results have proved this assumption wrong, but the 
municipality of Blat decided separately, in 2016, to 
establish its own treatment plant that would be built, 
owned and managed by a private company based on 
sorting and gasification technology, treating 200 
tonnes of waste per day for Blat and neighbouring 
areas (Kazzi, 2018).
14 Five supporters of the Free Patriotic Movement, three 
supporters of the Lebanese Forces, one Hezbollah supporter, 
and five supporters of former MP Fares Souaid.
Map 8. Hbaline dumpsite. Source: Google Earth, adjusted by the authors, 2018.
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In terms of technical and administrative design, the 
current system cannot address the needs of the 
serviced area. Without sorting at source and the full 
rehabilitation of the dumpsite into a sanitary landfill 
Hbaline is environmentally and financially 
unsustainable. The current plans to expand the sanitary 
landfill and create fermentation tunnels for composting 
would improve Hbaline’s operational efficiency. 
The Jbeil Union’s management of Hbaline since the 
mid-1980s demonstrates that local authorities still 
lack the financial, human and technical capacities to 
manage their solid waste. Despite being one of the old 
municipal unions in the country, and one that was 
subjected to central government interference in SWM, 
the Union could not devise a structured framework to 
manage its waste. Beyond purely technical, 
administrative, financial and political decision-making 
issues, the case of Jbeil Union suggests that a master 
plan for SWM is absent. This highlights the importance 
of planning and inter-municipal coordination as 
decisive success factors. The DRI 2019 survey report 
shows that, while most Lebanese local authorities 
advocate integrated solutions for SWM in which they 
play a major role, they still lack a concrete vision for it. 
This is especially true of municipalities, 50% of which 
have no plan for SWM, compared to 12% of municipal 
unions (DRI, 2019).
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4.  The Municipality of Saida and the Union of Municipalities  
of Saida-Zahrani: A Controversial High-Tech Approach
The district of Saida, located in the South-Lebanon 
governorate, has an estimated population of 250,000 
spanning 47 towns and villages along the coast and hilly 
interior. The eponymous capital of the district and its 
financial and administrative centre has approximately 
65,000 inhabitants and with its outlying areas 
constitutes the third-largest urban area in Lebanon in 
terms of population, after Beirut and Tripoli. The Saida-
Zahrani Union of Municipalities, established in 1978, is 
the sole union in the district and encompasses most of 
the greater Saida city area, along with several nearby 
villages, including 16 municipalities in total. Historically, 
the municipality of Saida city has played the leading 
role in managing the Union and its mayor is typically 
elected as the Union president.
Map 9. The Saida District and the Union of Municipalities of Saida-Zahrani. Source: Authors (2018).
The SWM system in the Saida area consists mainly of 
two sites. The first is an open-air dump along the coast, 
which was rehabilitated in 2015 by private companies 
hired by the municipality with international donor 
funding. The second is a waste treatment facility, again 
financed by external donors and managed by a private 
company, IBC, established in 2004.
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The Saida Region SWM system
An open-air dump established in 1975 on the southern 
shore of Saida city (only 200 metres away from 
residential areas) and managed by the municipality 
constituted its primary mode of managing solid waste 
for a long time. Soon after its establishment, the 
dumpsite became overloaded by rubble and demolition 
waste from buildings destroyed during the civil war. It 
still was used for solid waste disposal from neighbouring 
municipalities in the district (EJatlas, 2015). By the time 
it was dismantled in 2015, the so-called “rubbish 
mountain” contained approximately two million cubic 
metres of solid waste and received 300 tonnes of waste 
per day without maintaining a basal lining barrier or 
leachate15 collection system, both vital requirements of 
a sustainable landfilling system. 
The dump reached nearly 55 metres high and covered 
an area of 60,000 square metres. High summer 
temperatures caused recurrent fires, due to methane 
generated by decomposing organic waste, and fumes 
from the site exposed nearby residents to toxic air. 
There were concerns about environmental and health 
repercussions, and the stench prompted complaints 
from fishermen and city residents, and even an official 
warning from Cyprus (UNDP, 2013). The Saida dump 
was ranked first (for or concerning) its environmental 
risk potential (UNDP/MoE, 2016).
In part due to calls for action from government officials, 
civil society, the private sector, and the media, the 
municipality of Said, in collaboration with UNDP, 
decided to close the dumpsite in 2012. With support 
from UNDP, the Saudi Arabian government, and the 
Prince Walid Bin Talal Humanitarian Foundation (UNDP, 
2017), the dumpsite was transformed into a sanitary 
landfill using a “mining” technique that consists in 
treating waste at the dumpsite. The rehabilitation 
process also tackled the issue of leachate as well as 
gas emanations. In April 2016, a 33,000 square metre 
park was opened on the reclaimed land at the site.
The rehabilitation project was part of a larger plan for 
SWM in greater Saida. The city’s waste was redirected 
to a new site opened south of the urban centre, where 
the private company IBC built a mechanical biological 
treatment plant for organic waste in 2010, after the 
plan’s initial conception in 2002 and the designation of 
a 38,000 square metre site by the municipality in 2005.
15 Liquid, which may be partly produced by decomposition 
of organic matter, that has seeped through a landfill or 
a compost pile and has accumulated bacteria and other 
possibly harmful dissolved or suspended materials. 
Uncontrolled leachate can contaminate groundwater and 
surface water.
The IBC-run treatment plant did not begin operating 
until 2012, after five years of contract negotiations with 
the Saida-Zahrani Union. Currently, the IBC facility 
employs approximately 200 employees. Unlike the 
facilities of Bikfaya and Jbeil, the Saida facility has the 
necessary technical expertise to operate such a 
complex plant, including managers capable of 
interfacing between numerous partners, clients, sub-
contractors and consulting firms.
The treatment plant includes seven stages. Around 
500–600 tonnes of waste are delivered daily to the 
plant. NTCC, a private company contracted by the 
Union to collect and transport the waste within its 
area (including the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain el-
Helweh), delivers approximately 230 tonnes per day; 
the Union of Municipalities of Jezzine delivers 
approximately 12 tonnes, and the municipality of 
Beirut sends about 200 tonnes daily. The waste is then 
sorted, treated through a process of anaerobic 
digestion, and then processed to generate electricity. 
Organic materials are packaged as organic fertilisers, 
plastics are recycled, and refuse-derived fuel is sent 
to cement plants. 
Capacity issues have consistently plagued the Saida 
treatment facility, largely because of contractual 
shortcomings. Initially, the contract with IBC stipulated 
the sorting and treatment of 200 tonnes of waste daily, 
generated by Saida and the 15 municipalities 
constituting the Union, for 20 consecutive years, based 
on a feasibility study conducted by IBC to forecast the 
project’s profits from selling the generated compost 
and recyclables. In this scenario, IBC would not charge 
the municipalities for treating the incoming waste.
During the construction of the plant, IBC reported 
inaccuracies in its feasibility study. It claimed that the 
activity of informal waste collectors reduced its profit 
margin and that the revenues from the produced 
compost are too small given its poor quality, thus not 
enabling the recovery of operational costs. IBC raised 
this concern to the municipality of Saida and local 
politicians and froze its investment to negotiate new 
prices for incoming waste. 
To make the facility profitable, IBC said it would need to 
invest an additional sum of USD 15 million from its own 
funds to expand the facility, with a required minimum 
input of 350 tonnes of incoming waste and USD 85 per 
treated tonne in the first two years (instead of no cost, as 
initially projected), to be increased to USD 95 in the third 
and fourth years. This tariff would be revised every two 
years. After the intervention of Saida’s dominant political 
actors, mainly the Future Movement, the Union of Saida-
Zahrani agreed to this new contract. To reach the required 
minimum input, the Union of Jezzine and the municipality 
of Beirut send their waste to the facility. IBC expanded 
the facility to treat 500 tonnes of waste per day.
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Quantities arriving since 2015, however, have far 
surpassed this capacity, leading to the accumulation of 
waste near the facility. The temporary closure, for 
rehabilitation purposes, of an industrial waste-to-
energy facility in the Beqaa that received IBC’s residual 
waste after the treatment, led to further waste 
accumulation at the Saida site. IBC subsequently began 
shredding the residuals with gravel and dumping it in a 
nearby sea site enclosed by a breakwater, dubbed the 
“pond”.
The foul smell emanating from the contaminated 
“pond” led to protests organised by civil society 
activists and political opponents of the Future 
Movement-backed municipal council. An expert 
commissioned by the activists to determine the causes 
of air pollution concluded that the dumping of residuals 
in the “pond” was the main source of pollution. Activists 
then filed a lawsuit against IBC for breach of contract 
and encroaching on the public maritime domain. In the 
summer of 2018, protesters occupied the IBC plant, 
causing it to suspend its activity. Waste began piling up 
in the streets of Saida, which prompted the municipality 
and the Union to stop importing waste from outside the 
district and ask IBC to treat the waste appropriately. As 
of June 2019, the situation does not seem to have 
stabilised.
Graph 3. Original Design of the Sorting and Treatment Process. Source: Authors (2018).
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Political Dimensions of SWM  
in Saida Municipality
The Union of Saida-Zahrani, the municipality of Saida, 
and IBC are the central actors of the SWM system in the 
area. The fact that the mayor of Saida is also the Union 
president has caused some confusion and ambiguity as 
to the respective responsibility of the Union and 
municipality: while the Union is the main contracting 
authority, all negotiations with IBC were undertaken by 
the municipality. So far, the relationship between the 
municipality and IBC has been characterised by conflict 
and miscommunication.
Negotiations between the municipality and IBC’s 
general manager began in 2003, when no adequate 
municipal-owned land was available. The proposed 
solution was to allow the company to reclaim the 
needed land from the seaside, and to compensate the 
company with USD 8 million for this investment by 
offering ownership of the land after 20 years of 
operations. As this land is public maritime domain, its 
assignment to a private company is conditional upon 
the execution of a project of public interest. As such, 
IBC and the municipality agreed in 2012 that the land 
would be used only for SWM purposes. The contract 
also stipulates that, should the company fail to respect 
these terms, the municipality shall be entitled to take 
control of the plant’s operations at IBC’s cost. 
Additionally, the company would have to treat the 200 
tonnes of daily waste received from the district of Saida 
for no cost. 
Founded by the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and led 
by his son, current Prime Minister Saad Hariri, since 
2005, the Future Movement has its strongest base of 
electoral and popular support in the city of Saida, where 
the Hariri family originates from. Bahia Hariri, Rafiq’s 
sister, has been representing Saida in Parliament since 
1992, and the municipal councils elected in 1998, 2010 
and 2016 are endorsed by the Movement.
Since 2010, the mayor of Saida has led various SWM 
initiatives, in part due to a campaign promise that he 
would solve the city’s SWM problems. He has leveraged 
the support of the Future Movement, along with local 
prominent business leaders and other international 
investors. The mayor has marketed these efforts as 
part of a larger vision for Saida’s future, in which 
economic opportunity and quality of urban governance 
are mutually enhanced via public-private partnerships.
As the mayor of Saida, IBC’s general manager is a close 
affiliate of the Future Movement, which has strong 
relations to political and economic elites in Saudi 
Arabia. Given how the SWM treatment facility in Saida 
was funded (through Saudi assistance) and contracted 
(to IBC), dismantling the “rubbish mountain” and the 
creation of the facility is often framed as a Future 
Movement project. The project was suspended when 
opponents to the Future Movement camp won the 2004 
municipal elections, to be reinitiated when the 
Movement regained control in the municipal council in 
2010. Saudi funding, mediated through Future 
Movement channels, has played a role in the funding of 
the SWM project. When contractual issues marred the 
relationship between the municipality and IBC, the 
party-affiliated Minister of Interior and Municipalities 
at the time intervened to broker a resolution. To assist 
in the renegotiation of the contract with IBC, the 
municipality of Saida was relying on a legal consultant 
affiliated to the Hariri Foundation, the philanthropic 
wing of the Future Movement.
The implementation of SWM in Saida since 2010 has 
largely depended on local and national political 
networks, calling the system’s sustainability into 
question. A change of political control of the municipal 
council in 2022 could result in a radical change in the 
current SWM system.  
Assessment of the Saida-Zahrani SWM 
Strategy
According to its political backers, the Saida treatment 
facility and rehabilitation of the city’s “rubbish mountain”, 
have turned a catastrophic situation into an 
environmentally friendly and sustainable SWM system. 
Privatisation is praised for ensuring efficient management 
of solid waste. In this sense, IBC has consistently 
represented itself as a technological innovator and as 
adopting a more advanced treatment method than the 
landfilling or sorting facilities in other areas.
To its critics, the Saida treatment facility represents an 
effort by the Future Movement to maintain control over 
the local authority. Activists have criticised the position 
of the local authority towards the private contractor, 
which is sometimes perceived as keeping the local 
authority on a leash by offering limited choices or 
withdrawing when the terms and conditions did not 
result in a satisfactory profit. The local authority 
accepted contractual terms that, in addition to being 
not financially optimal, expanded the initial service 
area to ensure the operational and financial stability of 
the model proposed by the contractor. Activists also 
criticised that the local authority has not made enough 
efforts to encourage sorting at source.
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5.  The Municipality of Zahlé:  
A Successful Landfilling Approach that is Reaching  its Limits
Map 10. The district of Zahlé and its Unions of Municipalities. 
Source: Authors, based on the Localiban map (2018).
Zahlé is Lebanon’s fourth-largest city with approximately 
72,000 residents and an urban cluster of approximately 
157,000 people that extends far beyond the city’s 
municipal boundaries. It is located in the Beqaa 
Governorate. Currently, more than 160,000 refugees 
from Syria are residing there. The district of Zahlé 
contains 29 municipalities and 3 municipal unions: the 
Union of Zahlé District, the Union of East Zahlé, and the 
Union of Central Beqaa.
The municipality of Zahlé has a relatively large 
administration of 225 employees; its council has 21 
members and 35 municipal committees. It owns a 
sorting and composting facility and a sanitary landfill 
in Haouch el-Oumara, a flatland area just outside the 
city. Both facilities are managed by a private company 
contracted by the municipality and overseen by the 
mayor and a committee appointed by the municipal 
council.
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Zahlé’s SWM System
In the 1960s, the municipality of Zahlé created a 
dumpsite in Haouch el-Oumara, just outside the city 
limits, which reached its maximum capacity in the mid-
1990s. In 1998, the World Bank’s Household Solid Waste 
Management Plan (SWEMP) funded the acquisition of 
waste collection and street sweeping equipment for 
Zahlé and other cities, where construction works of 
sanitary landfills and rehabilitation of uncontrolled 
dumpsites were completed.
As part of this project, Zahlé’s new sanitary landfill was 
built on another municipal-owned land closer to the 
Litani river, where Zahlé’s wastewater treatment plant 
is hosted today. This landfill’s capacity was estimated 
to be reached in 2025. With USAID support (USD 2.4 
million), the municipality later enlarged the site by 
establishing a sorting facility and a methane flaring 
unit. In 2014, the municipality used EU funding to 
develop a composting facility in the same area, which 
reduced landfill by 70%.
The rehabilitation of the 1960’s-era Haouch el-Oumara 
dumpsite proceeded in several steps. While the original 
contract required excavation and transfer of 103,000 
cubic metres of solid waste, the actual amount of waste 
removed exceeded 225,000 cubic metres. The operator 
designed and installed a system to extract the biogas 
from the decomposing waste and burn it under 
controlled conditions. Once the solid waste was 
removed to below ground level, a cap consisting of 
compacted fill was placed over the entire site. Proposals 
aim at transforming the site for future public use, e.g. 
into a park, playground, sports field or vegetable 
market.
Recent concerns about the finite capacity of the Zahlé 
treatment and landfilling facilities have led the 
municipality to explore an alternative SWM system 
based on waste-to-energy technologies.
The waste management services provided by the 
municipality of Zahlé cover most municipalities of the 
district – a unique feature given the district’s sectarian 
and political diversity, the multiplicity of municipal 
unions, and the high number of refugees in the area, 
who have generated unexpected additional quantities 
of waste. Zahlé’s facility does not service the 
neighbouring towns of Qab Elias and Bar Elias, which 
dump and burn large quantities of waste.
Collection and transportation of solid waste to Zahlé’s 
facility fall under the responsibility of the 26 
municipalities using it. The city of Zahlé is estimated to 
generate approximately 115 tonnes of waste per day, 
collected by 14 trucks donated by the World Bank. The 
facility accepts five types of solid waste: household 
waste, retail waste, organic waste from parks and 
gardens, market waste, and demolition waste from 
households. Hazardous medical and industrial wastes 
are not accepted.
All non-recyclable materials, mainly organic waste, are 
either landfilled or composted. As the quality of the 
produced compost has not yet reached the desired 
standard to be commercialised, the compost is 
currently used as soil for the treatment of the landfill. 
Leachate is collected and sent to Al-Ghadir’s 
wastewater treatment station (south of Beirut), because 
the leachate treatment plant is not yet operational.
The treatment and disposal facilities of Zahlé include 
several technical components: (1) a sorting and 
processing plant with an average capacity of 250 
tonnes per day, (2) a composting facility with an 
average capacity of 90 tonnes per day, (3) a five-cell 
sanitary landfill, (4) a leachate treatment plant with a 
treatment capacity of 35 cubic metres per day, (5) a 
gas flaring unit with a maximum capacity of 300 Nm3 
(normal cubic metre) per hour, and (6) a non-
operational sorting and processing facility with an 
average capacity of 60 tonnes per day, which stopped 
its operations following the construction of the 
abovementioned processing plant.
In 2001, the municipality contracted a private company, 
SERDIM-SCS, to rehabilitate the old dumpsite, 
complete the construction and run the new sanitary 
landfill. It contracted another company in 2015, EES, to 
operate the waste sorting and composting facilities. A 
consulting firm, MORES, oversees the facility’s 
operations for the municipality on-site since 2011. The 
development of the Zahlé facility relied heavily on 
international donor funding, while the management of 
the facility is funded through revenues generated by 
processing incoming waste. The total cost per treated 
tonne is around USD 30, which is covered by the 
investment (USD 17 per tonne, financed by an 
international donor) and the revenues from operations 
(around USD 13–18 per tonne, paid by the municipalities). 
There is a very small profit margin. Revenues from the 
selling of recyclables are only USD 400–500 per month.
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Graph 4. Solid waste management in Zahlé. Source: Authors (2018).
Graph 5. The Sorting Process. Source: Authors (2018).
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International, National and  
Private Actors Involved
The municipality of Zahlé has maintained close relations 
with national and international actors to develop its 
SWM system. National authorities like the CDR, OMSAR 
and MoE have acted as mediators between the 
municipality and international donors, such as the 
World Bank, the EU, USAID, UK Aid, MercyCorps, and 
CHF International. Private contractors and consulting 
companies have also been involved in the process, 
usually operating on 3–5-year contracts. Assaad 
Zogaib, the mayor of Zahlé from 1998 to 2010 and again 
since 2016, has supported public-private partnerships 
and maintains strong relations with the city’s economic 
actors. Recently, he has been advocating waste-to-
energy as an alternative to landfilling.
The municipal council elected in 2016 was supported by 
a coalition of the three major Christian parties (Kataeb, 
Free Patriotic Movement, and Lebanese Forces), which 
defeated the list backed by Zahlé’s large families. The 
mayor does not seem to abide by partisan lines but 
promotes a technocratic approach. He claims the credit 
for ending waste dumping and open burning, and for 
introducing a very low price for waste treatment for 
municipalities (USD 13–18 per tonne depending on the 
municipality’s waste quantity), only reflecting the 
operational cost. These amounts contrast with the 
excessive prices and sub-par quality of services that 
characterised Sukleen’s contract with the central 
government. Indeed, Zogaib garnered popular support 
in 2007 to safeguard the municipality’s autonomy by 
rejecting the imposition of the CDR-run SWM contract 
for Zahlé. Despite joining the District of Zahlé Union of 
Municipalities in 2016 and the fact that the SWM facility 
services most towns and villages of the district, he also 
maintains that the municipality of Zahlé, rather than 
any of the district’s three unions, should maintain 
responsibility for the management of solid waste.
Assessment: Public-Private Partnerships
Like many others, Zogaib sees in SWM a potentially 
lucrative sector where the private sector should play a 
major role, particularly for financing investments, 
rather than relying on the support of international 
donors. Public-private partnerships allow local 
authorities to remain the steering force in developing 
the SWM sector. Mr. Zogaib is currently consulting with 
different actors and investors to launch a new PPP 
company that would build a waste-to-energy facility 
and generate electrical power by using a waste-energy 
alternative. 
Zahlé and the surrounding villages have managed to 
effectively control the impact of waste on underground 
water and the soil. Proper functioning of the sanitary 
landfill has prevented waste odours from spreading in 
the region around the landfill. The landfill’s location in 
an agricultural and industrial zone relatively far from 
residential areas has also helped minimise its toxic 
impact on the population, but these environmental 
achievements are not the result of innovative 
environmental technologies. 
However, the presence of a strong municipal government 
and political leadership are not enough to ensure 
sustainability. Local authorities remain dependent on 
revenue transfers from central government authorities 
and international donors. They also depend more on the 
personal networks of their leadership rather than an 
institutionalised system: when Zahlé’s mayor lost his 
seat between 2010 and 2016, the SWM facility was 
mismanaged and fell into disrepair, similar to the 
situation in Saida after the electoral loss of the Future 
Movement. The dependence of municipal efficacy on 
individuals rather than on institutions is a sign of 
fragility. 
Finally, it is striking that the municipality of Zahlé has 
been inactive, throughout this long process, in 
encouraging sorting at source. This is reflective of a 
paradox. According to DRI’s survey of 209 municipalities, 
91% of Lebanese municipalities favour sorting-at-
source, primary sorting and simple recycling techniques 
to mitigate the effects of the waste management crisis. 
However, only a quarter of them said they had started 
this process. In the case of Zahlé, the municipality has 
claimed that exorbitant resources would be necessary 
to lead awareness campaigns and modify citizens’ 
behaviours. The experience of Bikfaya, however, shows 
that grassroots initiatives do not require enormous 
resources if they tap into volunteer networks and are 
led by the municipality.
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Map 11. Service area of the Zahlé waste facility. 
Source: Authors, based on Localiban map of the Zahlé district (2018).
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6.  Emerging Dynamics in the Decentralised Management  
of Solid Waste in Lebanon
non-public actors (especially private companies) 
through formal and informal arrangements with local 
authorities – as in the case of Saida and as is planned in 
other municipalities like Blat, Beit Mery and Hbaline.16
While “conventional” waste capitalist ventures largely 
focused on waste collection and dumpsite management, 
the new investors are less interested in waste collection 
than in highly profitable treatment technologies that 
are new to Lebanon, such as composting and waste-to-
energy solutions through thermal or biological 
treatment, because they anticipate that legal and 
regulatory frameworks will allow them to profit more 
from these types of waste management. Such 
frameworks include the laws regulating the role of the 
private sector in the sectors of energy and water and 
the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Law No. 48 issued 
on 7 September 2017.
In Saida, the solution provided by the private company 
was not adequate to the nature of waste, which required 
costly adjustments, the price of which had to be borne 
by the local taxpayers. In Zahlé, the variability of solid 
waste composition has made it impossible to produce 
high-quality compost that can be commercialised. This 
negatively affected the performance of the private 
companies, which depend on the profits generated 
from solid waste. This quest for profitability often leads 
to the imposition of new contractual arrangements over 
which local authorities seem to have limited control. In 
the end, the informality and the ad hoc nature of local 
SWM policies often lead to an escalation between 
municipal and private actors, in which the latter 
maintain the upper hand.
Lebanese local authorities have reacted to this in two 
ways. Most commonly, they limited themselves to the 
role of a client and abdicated their responsibility to 
implement policies serving the interest of its 
constituency and ensuring the most affordable price. 
This carries the risk of local authorities adapting their 
policies to maintain or optimise the investors’ profit 
margins. In rare cases, they have clashed with private 
contractors over environmental, health, and urban 
planning concerns. In the contract negotiations and 
controversies arising from these concerns, the local 
authorities had to strike an unsteady balance between 
public and private interests.
The Lebanese political economy has long been oriented 
around political affiliations and been influenced by the 
country’s main political parties and their patrons, who 
are mostly wealthy landowners. Therefore, Lebanon’s 
16 A recent article suggests that corruption might be considerable 
in this sector (Jay, 2019).
The municipalities of Bikfaya, Saida, Zahlé and the 
Union of Municipalities of the Jbeil district showcase 
the innovative approaches and inclusive practices local 
authorities have used to manage solid waste, 
particularly against institutional, economic and 
financial challenges. 
The case studies offer a view of the diverse landscape 
of SWM policies and technologies but also local public 
policy in Lebanon. They show that, without an 
overarching institutional framework, policies and 
technical solutions are vulnerable to local geographies, 
the economy, politics, financial parameters, community 
engagement, and involvement of powerful local 
officials. Even if those frameworks are adopted, such 
factors will likely continue to wield a destabilising 
influence. 
Several trends can be identified in decentralised 
management of solid waste since 2015. The first trend 
is the shift, at the level of local authorities, towards the 
outsourcing of waste management by contracting 
private firms interested in more sophisticated 
technologies and therefore in more lucrative contracts. 
The second one is the adoption of only some good 
practices such as waste reduction, sorting-at-source, 
recycling and citizen engagement despite more 
encouraging initiatives. The third are structural 
challenges that local authorities grapple with to develop 
sustainable, scalable and economically viable solutions.
Waste Capitalism and the Imbalance 
Between Private and Public Actors
Since the Lebanese government’s contracting of 
Sukleen for the management of solid waste in greater 
Beirut and Mount-Lebanon in the 1990s, SWM became 
a highly profitable sector that was monopolised by large 
firms connected to influential political figures.
In recent years, we observe the emergence of a new 
dynamic in SWM that we label here as “new waste 
capitalism” because of the dominance of private sector 
companies in shaping solutions to SWM in Lebanon. 
While the waste capitalism of the 1990s, still present in 
the SWM contracts awarded for Beirut and Mount-
Lebanon, is associated with the dominant sectarian 
factions at the national level, the new one is developing 
at the local and regional levels and involving an 
increasing number of large private firms connected to 
political interests or motivated by profitability, at the 
expense of municipal interests. Central authorities, like 
the CDR, are less involved in the planning and the 
operation of new waste plants, which are now 
increasingly financed, implemented, and managed by 
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emerging SWM market rarely follows values like free 
competition, fairness, transparency and merit-based 
contract negotiation. The politicisation of SWM policies 
has been detrimental to good governance and the 
sustainability of these projects (Saida), but in some 
cases it also played a consolidating role (Bikfaya).
SWM Profitability and Financing Schemes 
In recent years, solid waste management has been 
marketed as potentially profitable, based on the 
assumption that resource recovery – using waste as an 
input material to create valuable products (in this case, 
generating revenues from selling compost products and 
recyclables) – could cover capital expenditures and 
operational costs. The case studies show that the break-
even point is far from being reached. This is caused by 
the absence of SWM financing and cost recovery 
systems rather than by technical shortcomings, i.e. 
inefficient treatment and recycling methods. Usually, 
SWM is funded by several sources levied from property 
taxes, charges on utility consumption bills, tourist taxes, 
user charges on households and commercial units, 
industrial taxes, and inter-governmental transfers. 
Without these, SWM is hardly sustainable.
Policymakers and municipal officials are reluctant to 
consider cost recovery schemes as a standard system 
to recoup capital expenditures and operational costs, 
anticipating a lack of acceptance from the Lebanese 
public towards the imposition of waste-related fees. 
Willingness-to-pay among households and businesses 
may indeed pose a challenge, but taxpayers’ resistance 
is usually lower in “waste aware” societies where the 
“polluter pays” principle and Extended Polluter 
Responsibility (EPR) are regulated and mainstreamed. 
Although these are present in Lebanese legislation, 
they are not implemented.  Increasing waste awareness 
through sensitisation campaigns and citizen-led 
initiatives should, therefore, be a priority for local 
authorities.
The paucity of the financing sources stipulated in 
Article 28 of the ISWM Law No. 80 is another example of 
policymakers’ distaste for cost recovery schemes: 
these sources are not yet established (National 
Environment Fund, National SWM Authority), not 
available (national budget and budget of local 
authorities), poorly regulated (loans and donations), or 
not efficiently managed (private sector investments). 
This contributes to maintaining the current status that 
is unfavourable to the introduction of local taxation and 
the emergence of new behaviours (ie. waste reduction 
and source separation).
Because of the small revenues from SWM facilities from 
resource recovery and the irregularity of IMF transfers 
(which are largely insufficient to fund advanced 
facilities), local authorities are in a constant state of 
financial precarity. Strong political backing was key to 
establish these facilities with external funding (from 
donor agencies or the central government), with some 
financial contribution by the local authorities that could 
afford it. But without a cost recovery system, there are 
no guarantees for SWM sustainability after the funding 
stops, even if economies of scale are achieved.
Land availability is also a crucial condition to establish 
SWM facilities, access foreign funding and benefit from 
the support of other parties. Buying land at relatively low 
prices before the urban sprawl was key in the local 
authorities of Zahlé and Jbeil. In a small, mountainous 
country like Lebanon where buildable land is limited, 
disposing of waste is a major issue for central and local 
governments alike (as is the case in Bikfaya, Saida and 
particularly Beirut). This has not only implications on the 
economy of SWM but also, like in Saida, environmental 
and political consequences. This calls for an upscale of 
SWM projects and implements them at the regional level 
in accordance with a national master plan for the sector. 
In the long-term, countries, where land is scarce like 
Lebanon, will reach a dead-end if they do not follow the 
path of the circular economy, based on the slogan: 
“Reduce, Reuse, Recycle”.
Instability of Institutional Frameworks 
for Managing Solid Waste
In the absence of a national master plan for SWM that 
sets key strategic objectives and determines areas 
where new facilities can be established and who they 
should serve, new waste capitalism can further 
destabilise the institutional relations between local, 
regional and central levels of government, especially 
since the facilities planned and implemented lack 
evidence-based feasibility and strategic planning. This 
could happen in Blat and Hbaline as outlined above as 
both are part of Jbeil district and the Union.
The new ISWM Law No. 80, issued on 10 October 2018, 
is likely to further destabilise multi-level governance of 
solid waste. Even though Article 9 of the law enshrines 
the decentralisation principle for managing waste, it 
entrusts central government authorities with large 
powers to run SWM projects. This is further consolidated 
in Article 4 of the law. In addition, the regulatory role of 
the National Solid Waste Management Authority to be 
established applies, as per Articles 13 and 16, only to 
centrally run projects, thereby omitting the necessity of 
institutional linkages between local authorities and a 
national regulatory body.
If a form of PPP is implemented at a local level, local 
authorities could become leading partners in establishing 
and running SWM facilities, as may be the case for 
Zahlé’s (or even Beirut’s) envisioned waste-to-energy 
plan. This can only happen when SWM policies are 
supported by rigorous technical feasibility studies, 
inclusive strategic planning and sound contract 
management.
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A Greater Need for Citizen Mobilisation 
for a Circular Economy
Local mobilisation proved to be a determining 
parameter in shaping SWM policies. In Zahlé, Saida, 
and Jbeil, mismanagement has led, at different stages, 
to public protests as a reaction to the deterioration of 
services. Because SWM is one of the most tangible 
aspects of municipal governance (it can be seen and 
smelt), public mobilisations and media controversies 
have criticised health and environmental issues 
arising from mismanagement of solid waste. In view of 
the recent mobilisations against “waste-to-energy” 
and waste incineration facilities, controversies around 
municipal policies in this regard are expected to 
heighten (Yan, 2019).
Sooner or later, public actors will have to address the 
use of incineration methods in Lebanon. There is 
scepticism regarding thermal treatment technologies 
and their potentially harmful consequences for public 
health and the environment. As the case of Saida shows, 
waste-to-energy treatment technologies have 
considerable challenges related to uncertainty 
regarding capacity and profitability. Even composting, 
a less controversial technology from an environmental 
point of view, has proven to be problematic given the 
lack of sorting-at-source initiatives and the difficulty of 
producing high-quality, profitable compost.
In this emerging landscape, Bikfaya stands out as an 
exception. The municipality was directly involved in the 
entire SWM cycle, from sorting-at-source to the 
managerial and technical aspects of BiClean, while 
having a long-term strategic objective towards waste 
reduction. The Bikfaya experiment shows that when 
public engagement is at the core of the SWM strategy, 
success rates are higher. Successful SWM does not 
only depend on strong relations with community actors 
and awareness campaigns, but it also requires a cost 
recovery system to foster behavioural change. 
Including Informal Recyclers
While overlooked in the capitalist approaches to waste 
management, informal actors of waste collection and 
recycling play an important role in the transition 
towards a circular economy. In Lebanon, these actors 
constitute between 5–15% of the SWM system and 
depend on private recycling companies to generate 
income from selling recyclables. For informal actors, 
unlike local authorities and private companies, 
collecting and selling recyclables is a matter of survival, 
not of profitability. Developing a strategy for integrating 
them into the SWM system has, therefore, a social 
dimension that goes beyond the mere environmental 
necessity of sorting and recycling.
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